Morocco's defensive technique

* Morocco - Portugal: 10pm on December 10, on MetaSports.

Spain is judged by experts to be more or less favorable when it only has to meet Morocco in the 1/8 round. But it also shows that the North African team is not properly recognized for their strength. It is not natural that the team under coach Walid Regragui has conceded exactly one goal from the beginning of the 2022 World Cup until now. And that only goal - in the defeat against Canada - was the goal of central defender Nayef Aguerd's home goal.

System 4-5-1 discipline to iron

Morocco's first match in Qatar 2022 was a 0-0 draw against Croatia, which was criticized as "boring". But from a professional perspective, the African representative from then on brought the image of a team with discipline, tight, persistent and hard to beat.

Before Croatia, Morocco only held the ball 35%. After that, Morocco controlled the ball 33% against Belgium, 41% against Canada, and only 23% before Spain. It is easy to see that the North African team is ready to give up complete control of the ball to the opponent and wait for the opportunity to counterattack.

The secret of Morocco's success lies in the mid-low defense system, which means maintaining a solid, tight formation from the midfield to the front of the goal. This team's system is 4-3-3 in theory, but in practice it is always 4-5-1 when the two wingers drop into midfield, or when the defense is low, it becomes 5. -4-1 with a winger in the area near the opponent's ball continuing to drop.

But the squad block is only one thing, the prerequisite problem lies in the clear, unshakable role of the individuals on the field in that system.

Before Croatia, Morocco's 4-5-1 structure forced Modric and Kovacic to go deep to make the ball. Morocco's midfield played excellently, fiercely in one-on-one pursuit. Their pressurization pattern changes sequentially, coherently: If Morocco's No 8 midfielders put pressure on Croatia's holding midfielder, the Amrabat midfield will no longer sweep the bottom, but move to catch people to fill up for teammates who have just risen. That way of military arrangement continued to be applied before Spain.

Before the 4-3-3 system of deploying the ball from the bottom line of the Spaniards, coach Regragui asked the spearhead striker Youssef En-Nesyri to always find a way to maintain his position in front of midfielder Sergio Busquets - also the Spain's extremely important ball rotation chain in the middle. The aim was to block the passing direction of the Spanish central defenders to Busquets, a tactical term called "cover shadow", or "cover shadow".

However, the level of sophistication and customization in Morocco's way of capturing people lies in this: Their No. 8 midfielder is always ready to move up, putting pressure on the skewed center-back holding the ball in the same area of ​​​​the opponent. If the opponent's lopsided centre-back pushes the ball out to the full-back, it's the Morocco winger's turn (who has now become a winger in the 4-5-1 system) to pressurize.

Morocco's wide attacking players Ziyech and Boufal, or like the striker En-Nesyri, who followed the coach's rules absolutely, always kept an excellent defensive position.

In the event that Morocco's No. 8 comes up to pressurize the deviant centre-back, Spain's No. 8 midfielders will be released, unchallenged. But then, the African representative responded with midfielder Sofyan Amrabat. The player playing for Fiorentina will move in sync to replace the teammate who has just risen, capturing the opponent's midfielder 8.

If Marco Asensio or Dani Olmo stepped back to receive the ball between the two lines, in order to combine with the number 8 midfielders to create an overwhelming number of troops in the area between the two lines, it was Amrabat who combined with the central defender pair to rise. fiercely clinging, will block the direction of passing the ball to these 9s, as well as not giving them time - space to manage.

However, Amrabat or Morocco's central defenders do not often have to rush into such duels. The harmony in the standing position and movement of the number 8 midfielders and wingers helped Morocco block the "slots" of passing the ball through the line.

In the pressure surges of the No. 8 midfielders or the Morocco wingers, they do not rush up vertically, but move in an arc, with a curve towards the edge. This is the familiar movement of players in systems that are proficient in pressing. The goal is to prevent skewed central defenders from getting the ball out to the full-back or to the wingers, while the full-backs don't have the right of way to the wingers.

So, with the phase of deploying the ball from the bottom line, if Spain wants to get on the ball sequentially, they must stab the ball straight into the inner corridors (ie the central armpit) for the number 8 midfielders. But space. in this area is limited and always waiting to be besieged. At this time, Busquets' position was blocked by En-Nesyri, and behind the Barca midfielder, there was also Amrabat. Therefore, Luis Enrique's students continuously passed crosses.

When Busquets was placed in a blockade cage, the number 8 midfielders Pedri and Gavi were forced to drop deep, receive the ball down the line, assist in deploying the ball up. At the same time, attacking players like Dani Olmo or Marco Asensio move without the ball between Morocco's midfield and defenders. But even so, the problem of shading remains unsolved.

Also because of Spain's tendency to move often to put pressure on skewed central defenders, the average position without the ball of Morocco's 8 midfielders will often be higher than that of the wingers.

Morocco's 4-5-1 system is like a wall. That wall undulates at the right time, in the right position, depending on the direction the opponent moves the ball. Punching, passing the ball across the line has always been Spain's weapon, but in the game with such close distance between the lines and between such tight positions of Morocco, Luis Enrique's students were simply deadlocked.

Spain also could not attract the enemy's troops to one side, then suddenly turned to attack the opposite side, because Morocco's 4-5-1 formation was divided into groups, catching people too synchronized. and awake. If Spain wants to create a left-wing coordination group with Alba, Olmo, Pedri and even Asensio moving down, Morocco has a group of Ziyech, Ounahi, Hakimi, Aguerd and even Amrabat. Busquets is also not free because he is always shadowed by En-Nesyri. At the same time, the group of four players remaining on the other wing of Morocco did not get caught up in the position of the ball and always kept the focus on Gavi, Torres and Llorente.

Also because Morocco always emphasizes a large number of troops on defense, just defending, they are also less able to create a military position that brings a well-defined counter-attack advantage. But with what was set out in the plan and the final result, coach Regragui is the winner.

The figures provided by FIFA after the match showed that, against Spain, when defending mid-range, the distance between the strikers and the Moroccan defenders was only 19 meters. And when the defense is low, that distance is only 16 meters. Those are all amazing numbers.

And during the 120 minutes of the ball rolling, without the ball, the Moroccans only spent 1% of the time applying high pressure, 4% mid-range pressure and 1% low-range pressure. The rest, they spend up to 33% of the time on maintaining the mid-range defense block, and 39% on the low-range defense block. Once again have to utter two words of amazement!